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The	  future	  is	  full	  of	  possibilities	  and,	  although	  we	  draw	  on	  our	  past	  experience	  to	  anticipate	  what	  is	  to	  
come,	  we	  must	  take	  uncertainty	  into	  account.	  	  For	  example,	  while	  preparing	  for	  a	  trip,	  we	  might	  pack	  a	  
raincoat	  and	  some	  sunglasses	  to	  be	  ready	  for	  multiple	  weather	  conditions.	  New	  research	  shows	  that	  the	  
ability	  to	  plan	  for	  multiple	  future	  possibilities	  may	  be	  present	  in	  human	  children	  from	  as	  early	  3-­‐4	  years	  
of	  age,	  but	  lacking	  in	  non-­‐human	  apes.	  
The	  mental	  construction	  of	  future	  episodes	  has	  drawn	  much	  attention	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  of	  research	  
[1].	  The	  ability	  to	  create	  future	  scenarios	  could	  offer	  a	  selective	  advantage	  in	  an	  uncertain	  world,	  and	  as	  
adult	  humans	  we	  project	  ourselves	  forward	  using	  ‘mental	  time	  travel’	  to	  anticipate	  what	  the	  future	  
might	  bring.	  	  There	  has	  been	  speculation	  that	  this	  ability	  may	  be	  unique	  to	  our	  species	  and	  contribute	  to	  
the	  definition	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  [2,	  3].	  Although	  previous	  comparative	  work	  has	  provided	  
evidence	  for	  future	  planning	  in	  non-­‐human	  animals	  [4,	  5],	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  preparatory	  actions	  in	  
these	  studies	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  simpler	  mechanisms	  like	  associative	  learning	  and	  innate	  programming	  
[6].	  Part	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  these	  examinations	  have	  fallen	  short	  of	  capturing	  the	  uncertain	  nature	  of	  
the	  future.	  	  Subjects	  were	  first	  trained	  to	  expect	  a	  certain	  state	  of	  affairs,	  and	  then	  researchers	  
investigated	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  could	  take	  steps	  to	  prepare	  for	  this	  predetermined	  environment.	  	  For	  
example,	  a	  group	  of	  apes	  were	  trained	  to	  use	  a	  tool	  to	  obtain	  food	  from	  a	  baited	  apparatus	  that	  they	  
learned	  would	  stay	  in	  a	  given	  location	  [7,	  8].	  	  In	  another	  location,	  the	  apes	  successfully	  chose	  the	  right	  
tool	  to	  take	  with	  them,	  forgoing	  an	  immediate	  reward	  [8],	  and	  even	  retaining	  the	  tool	  overnight	  [7].	  
Children	  from	  the	  age	  of	  3-­‐4	  years	  also	  succeed	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  task	  [9].	  	  However,	  by	  training	  or	  
explaining	  upcoming	  conditions	  to	  participants	  we	  remove	  the	  defining	  feature	  of	  the	  future	  itself,	  
inherent	  uncertainty.	  	  When	  the	  to-­‐be-­‐planned-­‐for	  future	  matches	  past	  experience,	  it	  might	  not	  require	  
the	  kind	  of	  mental	  scenario	  building	  that	  can	  deal	  with	  an	  uncertain	  future	  [10].	  	  A	  new	  study	  published	  
in	  this	  issue	  of	  Current	  Biology	  [11]	  introduces	  a	  task	  that	  involves	  planning	  for	  multiple	  possibilities.	  	  It	  
makes	  use	  of	  a	  simple	  and	  inherently-­‐rewarding	  task,	  the	  kind	  of	  minimalist	  design	  that	  can	  be	  used	  
across	  species.	  
The	  paradigm	  involves	  dropping	  a	  reward	  into	  a	  vertical	  tube	  which	  forks	  into	  two	  openings	  at	  the	  
bottom.	  To	  pass,	  subjects	  must	  use	  two	  hands	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  item	  possibly	  exiting	  either	  side.	  	  
Children’s	  performance	  increased	  linearly	  with	  age:	  two-­‐year-­‐olds	  did	  not	  consistently	  cover	  both	  
openings	  but	  most	  of	  the	  older	  children	  did.	  The	  developmental	  trajectory	  shown	  in	  this	  study	  is	  
comparable	  to	  that	  in	  the	  wider	  literature	  on	  age-­‐related	  changes	  in	  future-­‐thinking	  capabilities	  [12].	  	  
Ape	  performance	  was	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  two-­‐year-­‐olds.	  	  Some	  individuals	  were	  able	  to	  pass	  the	  task	  
after	  some	  experience,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  maintain	  this	  behaviour	  over	  all	  trials,	  and	  always	  regressed	  to	  a	  
one-­‐handed	  strategy.	  	  The	  authors	  take	  this	  to	  indicate	  that	  despite	  possessing	  the	  requisite	  physical	  
skills,	  the	  apes	  and	  two-­‐year-­‐olds	  lacked	  the	  ability	  to	  plan	  for	  multiple	  future	  possibilities.	  What	  
remains	  unclear	  from	  the	  current	  work	  is	  what	  is	  responsible	  for	  this	  difference	  in	  ability.	  	  What	  is	  
missing	  in	  apes	  and	  younger	  children?	  	  	  
The	  authors	  suggest	  that	  the	  skill	  that	  makes	  the	  difference	  could	  be	  metarepresentation:	  the	  ability	  to	  
reflect	  on	  representations	  themselves,	  for	  example,	  to	  reflect	  that	  one’s	  prediction	  might	  be	  wrong	  [13].	  	  
This	  seems	  plausible,	  because	  by	  the	  age	  of	  four	  children	  begin	  to	  show	  evidence	  of	  other	  skills	  in	  which	  
different	  representations	  of	  reality	  must	  be	  entertained,	  such	  as	  identifying	  the	  content	  of	  another	  
individual’s	  false	  belief	  [14].	  However,	  responding	  to	  the	  uncertainty	  created	  by	  multiple	  possible	  
outcomes	  need	  not	  entail	  an	  ability	  to	  metarepresent	  them	  as	  such	  [15].	  	  Previous	  research	  has	  shown	  
that	  great	  apes	  can	  take	  multiple	  courses	  of	  action	  in	  tasks	  where	  they	  are	  uncertain	  [16].	  Suda	  and	  Call	  
reported	  that	  apes	  faced	  with	  uncertainty	  about	  which	  of	  two	  cups	  contained	  the	  greater	  reward	  would	  
use	  both	  hands	  and	  point	  to	  both	  cups.	  Conversely,	  an	  experiment	  by	  Beck	  and	  colleagues	  showed	  that	  
children	  can	  represent	  alternative	  states	  of	  reality	  without	  spontaneously	  preparing	  for	  multiple	  
possibilities	  [17].	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  new	  study,	  in	  this	  experiment,	  a	  toy	  mouse	  could	  go	  down	  a	  forked	  
slide,	  but	  here	  the	  task	  for	  children	  was	  to	  lay	  out	  mats	  to	  catch	  the	  mouse.	  	  Only	  a	  minority	  of	  3-­‐	  to	  5-­‐
year-­‐old	  children	  took	  the	  precaution	  of	  laying	  down	  two	  mats,	  but	  they	  were	  able	  to	  answer	  
counterfactual	  questions	  about	  where	  the	  mouse	  would	  be	  if	  he	  had	  gone	  the	  other	  way.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  
the	  relationship	  between	  representational	  and	  planning	  abilities	  remains	  an	  open	  and	  intriguing	  
question.	  
The	  authors	  accept	  that	  there	  are	  other	  explanations	  for	  the	  difference	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  ruled	  
out.	  	  One	  possibility	  is	  background	  knowledge.	  	  In	  order	  to	  pass	  the	  task	  from	  the	  first	  trial,	  subjects	  
must	  understand	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  in	  order	  to	  know	  that	  there	  can	  be	  multiple	  possible	  outcomes	  
[18].	  	  Problematically,	  there	  is	  some	  indication	  that	  apes	  and	  two-­‐year-­‐olds	  struggle	  with	  prediction	  on	  a	  
task	  in	  which	  food	  travels	  through	  a	  bent	  tube,	  even	  when	  there	  is	  only	  one	  possible	  exit.	  	  Both	  young	  
children	  and	  chimpanzees	  incorrectly	  expected	  food	  dropped	  into	  an	  opaque	  slanted	  or	  S-­‐shaped	  tube	  
to	  have	  fallen	  straight	  down	  [19,	  20].	  	  While	  the	  authors	  of	  this	  new	  study	  report	  that	  subjects	  did	  not	  
place	  their	  hands	  where	  a	  gravity	  bias	  would	  predict	  (directly	  beneath	  where	  the	  food	  was	  dropped),	  it	  
remains	  possible	  that	  weak	  object	  knowledge	  could	  account	  for	  poor	  performance.	  	  
Although	  there	  are	  multiple	  possible	  interpretations	  of	  the	  results,	  this	  study	  uses	  a	  clever	  minimalist	  
paradigm	  to	  forge	  a	  new	  path	  for	  comparative	  research.	  	  Work	  of	  this	  kind	  is	  vital	  if	  we	  are	  to	  investigate	  
what,	  if	  anything,	  is	  unique	  about	  human	  foresight	  [2].	  	  Future	  research	  could	  shed	  more	  light	  on	  what	  
causes	  success	  and	  failure	  on	  this	  task.	  	  Does	  anticipating	  multiple	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  a	  physical	  event	  
that	  is	  about	  to	  unfold	  require	  the	  ability	  to	  project	  oneself	  into	  the	  future?	  	  To	  this	  end,	  it	  would	  be	  
interesting	  to	  know	  how	  performance	  on	  this	  task	  relates	  to	  planning	  for	  a	  more	  distant	  future.	  	  The	  
findings	  from	  the	  new	  study	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  both	  developmental	  and	  comparative	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Figure	  1:	  Imagining	  the	  future	  or	  learning	  from	  the	  past?	  Previous	  studies	  of	  future	  thinking	  in	  apes	  
involved	  teaching	  subjects	  how	  to	  use	  a	  tool	  to	  solve	  a	  puzzle,	  such	  as	  using	  a	  straw	  to	  drink	  juice	  
[8].	  In	  another	  room,	  apes	  successfully	  selected	  this	  tool	  and	  later	  transported	  it	  to	  the	  puzzle,	  
but	  critics	  argue	  that	  this	  might	  be	  driven	  by	  past	  experience	  with	  the	  tool	  rather	  than	  genuine	  
forethought	  [2].	  Drawing	  by	  Leigh	  Wagner.	  
